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 1 
TRANSPARENCY AND PARTICIPATION IN THE WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION 
Steve Charnovitz* 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is frequently criticized for 
insufficient transparency and for a lack of participatory opportunities 
for private individuals and civic society.1 For example, consider the 
views of Lori Wallach, one of the most prominent opponents of the 
WTO.2 In a recently-published “comprehensive guide to the WTO” co-
authored by Wallach and her colleague Patrick Woodall, a series of 
criticisms were leveled, including the following: 
WTO business is conducted by committees and panels that 
meet behind closed doors in Geneva, Switzerland. 
. . . . 
    In sharp contrast to domestic courts and even other 
international agreements, at the WTO there is a startling 
lack of transparency, public disclosure or accountability. 
. . . . 
    . . . [T]he WTO is intentionally designed to insulate 
against democratic pressure for change.3 
Because Wallach is an outsider to the WTO, it would be fair to 
balance her views against what the insiders are saying. One insider 
and frequent WTO defender is James Bacchus, a former U.S. 
Congressman and an original member of the WTO Appellate Body 
who served on that tribunal longer than anyone else.4 After 
departing from the Appellate Body in early 2004, Bacchus wrote an 
op-ed for the Washington Post in which he said: 
We must open the doors of the WTO. We need to let in the 
light of public scrutiny—let the 6 billion people in the world 
who are served by the WTO see the organization as it really 
is. 
 
 *  Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School.  
Forthcoming Rutgers Law Review, 2005. 
 1. PHILIPPE LEGRAIN, OPEN WORLD: THE TRUTH ABOUT GLOBALISATION 200-01 
(2002). 
 2. Moisés Naim, Lori’s War, FOREIGN POL’Y, Spring 2000, at 29 (an interview with 
Lori Wallach), available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/Issue119PDfs/28-
55wallach.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2004). 
 3. LORI WALLACH & PATRICK WOODALL, WHOSE TRADE ORGANIZATION? A 
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO THE WTO 15-16 (2004). 
 4. See generally JAMES BACCHUS, TRADE AND FREEDOM (2004). 
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. . . . 
    . . . Those who oppose the WTO can portray it in the 
distorted way they do only because, by keeping the doors 
closed, the organization’s members make it possible, and 
seemingly credible, for them to do so.5 
In my opinion, Wallach and Bacchus stand as far apart as two 
people can be on the overall merits for humanity of the WTO and 
international trade. Yet both share the view that the WTO is 
deficient with respect to its openness. 
I agree with such criticism and join others in this symposium to 
urge that the WTO promote greater public understanding and citizen 
participation. My specific contribution will be to point out the 
common thread between the norms espoused by the WTO for 
national transparency and the analogous norms now lacking within 
the WTO as an organization. Promoting transparency and 
participation in each of the two levels of governance—national and 
international—will be mutually reinforcing and serve to enhance 
governmental accountability. 
This article proceeds in the following manner. Part I explores the 
development in international trade law of the norm for transparency 
and participation at the national level. Part II describes the WTO’s 
practices regarding openness and public participation, and then 
criticizes the current limitations. In doing so, I discuss why the 
WTO’s norms for national government should be applied to the 
international trading system and why administrative law principles 
are relevant to the WTO. Part III proposes several new steps for the 
WTO to take to promote transparency and participation. Part IV 
concludes. 
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSPARENCY NORM IN 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 
Although I am unaware of any historical study of the emergence 
of international norms on transparency and citizen participation, 
some key moments are apparent. One foundational development 
was Immanuel Kant’s attention to “capacity for publicity” in his 
essay Perpetual Peace (1795).6 In Kant’s view, the “transcendental 
formula of public right” (or public law) is that “[a]ll actions that affect 
 
 5. James Bacchus, Open Up the WTO, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 2004, at A25 
(emphasis original). 
 6. Immanuel Kant, To Perpetual Peace. A Philosophical Sketch, in PERPETUAL 
PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS ON POLITICS, HISTORY, AND MORALS 107, 135 (Ted 
Humphrey trans., 1983); see Ruth Buchanan, Perpetual Peace or Perpetual Process: 
Global Civil Society and Cosmopolitan Legacy at the World Trade Organization, 16 
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 673, 692 (2003) (noting that Kant’s emphasis on publicity prefigures 
the current transparency debate). 
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the rights of other men are wrong if their maxim is not consistent 
with publicity.”7 An important intergovernmental action was the 
inclusion of Article 18 in the Treaty of Versailles providing that 
“[e]very treaty or international” agreement shall be registered by the 
Secretariat of the League of Nations and “shall as soon as possible 
be published by it[,]” and, furthermore, that “[n]o such treaty or 
international engagement shall be binding until so registered.”8 
These developments may have provided intellectual context for the 
emergence of transparency as an issue of international trade law. 
The foundation stone of international norms for transparency 
was the 1923 International Convention Relating to the 
Simplification of Customs Formalities (“Customs Convention”).9 The 
Customs Convention established rules for transparency and review 
at the national level.10 All customs regulations were required to be 
promptly published “in such a manner as to enable persons 
concerned to become acquainted with them and to avoid the 
prejudice which might result from the application of customs 
formalities of which they are ignorant.”11 Moreover, no customs 
regulations were to be enforced before being published unless 
“previous publication would be likely to injure the essential interests 
of the [regulating] country.”12 With regard to import and export 
licenses, the Customs Convention dictated that the conditions to be 
fulfilled “should be brought immediately in the clearest and most 
definite form to the notice of the public.”13 Following implementation 
of a regulation, the Convention directed states to use “the most 
appropriate measures by their national legislation and 
administration, both to prevent the arbitrary or unjust application of 
their laws[,] . . . and to ensure redress by administrative, judicial or 
arbitral procedure for those who may have been prejudiced by such 
abuses.”14 If a dispute arose between the parties on these 
commitments, either party could refer the matter to the Permanent 
Court of International Justice.15 No referrals to the Permanent Court 
 
 7. Kant, supra note 6, at 135. 
 8. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, June 
28, 1919, The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923, Vol.1, art. 18 [hereinafter Treaty of 
Versailles]. Writing in 1919, the educator David Jayne Hill noted the significance of 
this provision. DAVID JAYNE HILL, PRESENT PROBLEMS IN FOREIGN POLICY 34-35 (1919). 
 9. International Convention Relating to the Simplification of Customs 
Formalities, Nov. 3, 1923, 19 AM. J. INT’L L. SUPP. 146 (1925) [hereinafter Customs 
Convention]. The United States was not a party to this Convention. 
 10. See id. 
 11. Id. art. 4. Customs regulations were defined broadly to include “tariffs and 
[all] import and export prohibitions or restrictions.” Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. art. 3(a). 
 14. Id. art. 7. 
 15. Id. art. 22, para. 3. This applied to the rule about enforcement before 
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occurred.16 
This international customs law is remarkable in its modernity. 
The Customs Convention supervises the domestic policy process, and 
the designated beneficiaries are not only the parties to the 
Convention but also “persons concerned,”17 a class that could include 
domestic persons as well as aliens. Furthermore, the Convention’s 
rules are backed up by dispute settlement. It is also interesting to 
note that the Protocol to the Convention contains what is now called 
a “savings clause”18 to defer to past or future international treaties 
relating to the preservation of the health of human beings, animals, 
or plants and to the protection of public morals or international 
security.19 
The Convention itself lacks any provision about transparency 
and nongovernmental participation in the Convention’s 
implementation.20 No historical account of the Convention’s 
implementation is readily available, and I do not know the extent of 
transparency attained. In general, the economic activities of the 
League of Nations did feature considerable transparency and some 
private participation.21 
The Convention’s history is clear in one interesting respect, 
namely, an unusually inclusive negotiating process.22 The depth of 
the Convention’s commitment to transparency can be traced to the 
extensive participation by the International Chamber of Commerce 
 
publication, but not to the rule about prompt publication. Id. art. 22, para. 3. For that 
rule, the parties had to agree on referring the dispute to an arbitral or judicial 
procedure. Id. art. 22, para. 1. In ratifying the Customs Convention, Roumania 
declared its understanding that Article 22 applies to questions of a general nature, 
with “private persons being only entitled to appeal to their own judicial authorities.” 
Id., at 165. 
 16. See the following website for a list of cases of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice for the years 1922-1940, 
http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/pcij-listofcases.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004). 
 17. Customs Convention, supra note 9, art. 4. para. 1. 
 18. See Laurence R. Helfer, Constitutional Analogies in the International Legal 
System, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 193, 218 (2003) (discussing a savings clause). 
 19. Customs Convention, supra note 9, at 166. 
 20. See Customs Convention, supra note 9. 
 21. See generally H.R.G. GREAVES, THE LEAGUE COMMITTEES AND WORLD ORDER 
(1931). 
 22. The process was inclusive in the sense of listening to the views of the 
organized business community. GEORGE L. RIDGEWAY, MERCHANTS OF PEACE 204, 207–
08, 211–14, 216, 232 (1938).Labor unions, women’s groups, and environmentalists were 
not present at the negotiating conference, but to my knowledge, they did not ask to be. 
International Conference on Customs and Other Similar Formalities, League of 
Nations, C.D.I.96(1) (1923). The feature that was unusual about the 1923 conference 
was that the International Chamber of Commerce participated extensively. RIDGEWAY, 
supra, at 225. As George Ridgeway explained, the conference negotiations utilized the 
common feature of national government in which interested groups are given an 
opportunity to assist in shaping law. See RIDGEWAY, supra, at 212-13. 
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in the Convention’s drafting process.23 As historian George L. 
Ridgeway pointed out, “[t]he influence of the International Chamber 
was particularly noteworthy in the formation of policy on the subjects 
of publicity, treatment of commercial travelers and samples, and 
redress.”24 
The Customs Convention episode provides a good illustration of 
the symbiosis between transparency and participation at the 
national and international levels because nongovernmental 
participation in an international conference was an important factor 
in getting governments to establish better norms for transparency at 
the national level. The fact that this norm developed so early in the 
international trade regime, rather than in other regimes, may be 
because transnational private interactions are the very essence of 
international trade.25 
By contrast, other international regimes were able to operate for 
a long time without much attention to the domestic regulatory 
process.26 For example, the international labor regime developed 
contemporaneously with the trade regime and yet the organic act of 
1919 creating the International Labour Organization (ILO) omits 
considerations of transparency or due process at the national level.27 
Not until 1960 did the ILO get around to giving concerted attention 
to the need for norms at the national level to improve governmental 
decisionmaking.28 In that year, the ILO approved Recommendation 
113 concerning consultation and co-operation between public 
authorities and employers’ and workers’ organisations at the 
industrial and national levels.29 Among its purposes, the 
Recommendation aims to ensure that governments seek the views of 
these organizations in “the preparation and implementation of laws 
and regulations affecting their interests.”30 Note that the ILO’s 
initial lack of transparency norms for governments stood in sharp 
contrast to its pathbreaking norms for the participation of nonstate 
actors—in particular, employer and worker organizations—in all ILO 
 
 23. See id. at 209-16. 
 24. Id. at 213. The International Chamber of Commerce was consulted by a working 
party of the GATT Contracting Parties in the early 1950s. See International 
Convention to Facilitate the Importation of Commercial Samples and Advertising 
Material, GATT, BISD 1S/94, paras. 3, 27, 29, 30. 
 25. See ARIKA IRIYE, GLOBAL COMMUNITY 12-13 (2002) (noting the connection 
between capitalism and the development of nongovernmental organizations). 
 26. See SIR ARTHUR SALTER, WORLD TRADE AND ITS FUTURE 2-3 (1936) (explaining 
that “normally it is not nations but individuals that trade with each other”). 
 27. See Treaty of Versailles, supra note 8, Part XIII (organizing the ILO). 
 28. See R113 Consultation (Industrial and National Levels) Recommendation, 
International Labour Organization (June 20, 1960), available at 
http://www.ilo.org./ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?R113 (last visited Nov. 3, 2004). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. para. 5(b)(i). 
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activities.31 
When the United Nations convened negotiations on 
international trade in 1946, the governments used the Customs 
Convention as a reference point for writing new rules on the customs 
process.32 One might have expected the governments to build on and 
strengthen the disciplines in that Convention. Yet as John H. 
Jackson has pointed out, what happened instead is that some of the 
provisions of the 1923 Convention were watered down to the point 
where the Charter of the International Trade Organization (“ITO”)33 
and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) 
“represented a backward step.”34 
In regard to transparency, the major difference between the 
Customs Simplification Convention and GATT Article X (Publication 
and Administration of Trade Regulations), in my view, is that Article 
X’s disciplines35 apply only to measures “of general application,”36 
 
 31. Treaty of Versailles, supra note 8, Part XIII; see generally ERNST B. HAAS, 
BEYOND THE NATION STATE: FUNCTIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION ch. 6 
(1964) (discussing the organizational ideology of the ILO from 1919-1948). 
 32. JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 441 (1969). 
 33. Id.; see also RICHARD N. GARDNER, STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY 369-78 (1956) 
(discussing the end of the ITO and why it did not enter into force). 
 34. JACKSON, supra note 32, at 441; see General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11 [hereinafter GATT]. The GATT, as amended, is available at 
the WTO website, http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm (last visited 
Nov. 3, 2004). 
 35. GATT Article X:1 states in part: 
Laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general 
application, made effective by any contracting party, pertaining to the 
classification or the valuation of products for customs purposes, or to rates 
of duty, taxes or other charges, or to requirements, restrictions or 
prohibitions on imports or exports or on the transfer of payments therefor, 
or affecting their sale, 
distribution, transportation, insurance, warehousing inspection, exhibition, 
processing, mixing or other use, shall be published promptly in such a 
manner as to enable governments and traders to become acquainted with 
them. 
GATT Article X:2 states in part: 
No measure of general application taken by any contracting party effecting 
an advance in a rate of duty or other charge on imports under an established 
and uniform practice, or imposing a new or more burdensome requirement, 
restriction or prohibition on imports, or on the transfer of payments 
therefor, shall be enforced before such measure has been officially 
published. 
GATT, supra note 34, arts. X, paras. 1, 2. 
 36. GATT, supra note 34, art. X, para. 2. The WTO Secretariat has published a 
useful note on the negotiating history of Article X in the 1946-48 period. See Article X 
of the GATT 1994 – Scope and Application, Note by the Secretariat, G/C/W/374, at 1-4 
(May 14, 2002), 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tradfa_e/tradfa_overview2002_e.htm (last visited 
Nov. 3, 2004). 
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while the corresponding provisions in the Convention do not contain 
that limitation.37 In regard to the review of administrative action, the 
disciplines in the Convention and the GATT are similar except on 
one important point in which the GATT goes further.38 The GATT 
requires that the review of administrative action regarding customs 
matters be done by tribunals or procedures that are “independent” of 
the agency that took the contested administrative action.39 In 
contrast, the Convention’s provision for “redress” lacked an 
independence requirement.40 
From 1948 to 1995, only one case occurred in which a 
government’s trade measure was challenged pursuant to GATT 
Article X and found to be a violation.41 That was the 1989 decision in 
European Economic Community – Restrictions on Imports of Apples, a 
complaint by the United States.42 One charge in that dispute was 
that the European Economic Community (“EEC”) had imposed a 
quota on apples effective February 14, 1988 yet did not publish the 
regulation until April 20, 1988.43 While noting that such publication 
met Article X:1’s requirement that measures “be published 
promptly,” the panel, nevertheless, held that the EEC’s quota 
violated Article X:1 because (as the panel saw it) the provision 
prohibits “back-dated quotas.”44 The panel’s reasoning is a bit hard 
to understand, however, because its decision reveals no arguments 
by the complaining government for the Article X violation.45 Litigation 
has occurred a bit more frequently in the WTO and the tendency of 
adjudicators has largely been deferential to national law.46 For 
 
 37. Compare GATT, supra note 34, art. X, paras. 1, 2 (requiring publication of 
“[l]aws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general 
application”), with Customs Convention, supra note 9, art. 4 (requiring publication of 
“all regulations relating to customs and similar formalities”). 
 38. Compare GATT, supra note 34, art. X, para. 3(b) with Customs Convention, 
supra note 9, art. 7. 
 39. GATT, supra note 34, art. X, para. 3(b). 
 40. Customs Convention, supra note 9, art. 7. 
 41. WTO, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 295-98 (1995). 
 42. European Economic Community – Restrictions on Imports of Apples – 
Complaint By the United States, Report of the Panel, BISD 36S/135 (adopted June 22, 
1989), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/gt47ds_e.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 
2004). 
 43. Id. para. 5.22. 
 44. Id. paras. 5.21, 5.23 . 
 45. See id. para. 5.1 (indicating no specific arguments by the U.S. government for 
the violation of Article X). 
 46. A narrow/strict interpretation has also occurred with regard to GATT Article 
X:3(a) which requires governments to administer “laws, regulations, decisions, and 
rulings” in a “uniform, impartial, and reasonable manner all its laws, regulation.” 
GATT, supra note 34, art. X, para. 3(a); see European Communities – Regime for the 
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Report of the Appellate Body, 
WT/DS27/AB/R, paras. 200-01 (adopted Sept. 9, 1997), 
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example, in European Communities – Measures Affecting the 
Importation of Certain Poultry Products, the Appellate Body held 
that GATT Article X:1 applies only to rules of general application, 
not to specific rulings for individual shipments.47 
The only GATT Article X transparency violation found by a WTO 
tribunal occurred in United States – Restrictions on Imports of Cotton 
and Man-made Fibre Underwear, where the panel saw a violation of 
Article X:2 because the U.S. safeguard period was retroactive to 
imports occurring before the date of publication of the restraint.48 The 
plaintiff government Costa Rica appealed some matters in Cotton 
Underwear, which gave the Appellate Body an opportunity in 1997 to 
expound GATT Article X. In its decision, the Appellate Body stated: 
Article X:2, General Agreement, may be seen to embody a 
principle of fundamental importance - that of promoting full 
disclosure of governmental acts affecting Members and private 
persons and enterprises, whether of domestic or foreign nationality. 
The relevant policy principle is widely known as the principle of 
transparency and has obviously [sic] due process dimensions. The 
essential implication is that Members and other persons affected, or 
likely to be affected, by governmental measures imposing restraints, 
requirements and other burdens, should have a reasonable 
opportunity to acquire authentic information about such measures 
and accordingly to protect and adjust their activities or alternatively 
to seek modification of such measures.49 
This is a significant interpretation because very few of the 
disciplines in GATT are generally thought to encompass persons and 
enterprises of domestic nationality vis-à-vis their own government.50 
Here the Appellate Body recognizes the fundamental nature of the 
transparency principle in GATT Article X:2 and its importance to 
private persons and enterprises on both sides of a transborder 
 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/distab_e.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004) 
(reversing the panel and holding that the discipline in Article X:3(a) applies only to 
the administration of laws, regulations, etc., not to the laws and regulations 
themselves). In a subsequent case, the Appellate Body explained that complaints 
about the “substantive content” of national trade rules would not come within the 
scope of Article X. European Communities – Measures Affecting the Importation of 
Certain Poultry Products, Report of Appellate Body, WT/DS69/AB/R, para. 115 
(adopted July 13, 1998), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/69abre.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2004) [hereinafter EC Poultry Appellate Body Report]. 
 47. EC Poultry Appellate Body Report, supra note 46, paras. 113-15. 
 48. United States – Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-made Fibre 
Underwear, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS24/AB/R, at 21 (adopted Feb. 25, 
1997), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/distab_e.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 
2004) [hereinafter U.S. Cotton Underwear Appellate Body Report]. 
 49. Id. 
 50. JACKSON, supra note 32, at 187. 
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transaction.51 Moreover, the Appellate Body sees a “due process” 
dimension to transparency, and seems to suggest that Article X has 
implications not only for WTO Members but also for “other persons” 
who should have a reasonable opportunity to acquire the information 
about a customs measure that will enable them either to adjust 
their activities or to go to a government “to seek modification of such 
measures.”52 This is the first caselaw of the WTO to explicitly make 
the connection between information transparency for the public and 
the ability of the affected individual to act on the information by 
participating in a government’s administrative review process.53 
The Appellate Body returned to GATT Article X in the United 
States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products 
case.54 At issue was whether the U.S. import ban on shrimp could be 
justified under the General Exceptions in GATT Article XX.55 Sua 
sponte, the Appellate Body stated that GATT Article X:3 could aid in 
the interpretation of Article XX because Article X:3 “establishes 
certain minimum standards for transparency and procedural 
fairness in the administration of trade regulations . . . . “56 The issue 
of procedural fairness had arisen because the Appellate Body had 
found that the U.S. government denied “basic fairness and due 
process” to foreign governments applying for certification under the 
U.S. shrimp-turtle regulation.57 
The transparency and review principles in GATT Article X 
served as an inspiration to governments in the drafting of analogous 
provisions in many of the new Uruguay Round agreements for goods, 
services, and intellectual property.58 For example, the provisions in 
GATT Articles X:1 and X:2 on publication are reflected in Article 7 
(Transparency) of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures,59 in Article III (Transparency) of the 
 
 51. U.S. Cotton Underwear Appellate Body Report, supra note 48, at 21. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See id. 
 54. Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 1998), 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/58abr.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2004) 
[hereinafter U.S. Shrimp Appellate Body Report]; see also Armin von Bogdandy, 
Legitimacy of International Economic Governance: Interpretive Approaches to WTO 
Law and the Prospects of its Proceduralization, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
GOVERNANCE AND NON-ECONOMIC CONCERNS 103, 131 (Stefan Griller ed., 2003) 
(discussing the Appellate Body’s rulings on GATT Article X). 
 55. U.S. Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra note 54, paras. 1, 98. 
 56. Id. para. 183. 
 57. Id. para. 181. 
 58. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 
15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2004) 
[hereinafter WTO Agreement]. 
 59. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, WTO 
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General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS),60 in Article 12 of the 
Customs Valuation Agreement,61 and in Article 63 (Transparency) of 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (“TRIPS”).62 The provisions in GATT Article X:3(b) on 
independent review are reflected, for example, in Article 13 (Judicial 
Review) of the Antidumping Agreement,63 in GATS Article VI:2(a),64 
and in TRIPS Article 41.4.65 
In one important area, however, the governments drafting the 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 
(“WTO Agreement”)66 went beyond the transparency principles in 
GATT Article X to develop a new participation principle for the 
WTO.67 Under this principle, private economic actors should have a 
right to participate in the making of designated types of trade policy 
at the national level. The need for enhancing such participation had 
been recommended by the “Leutwiler Group” report of 1985, and 
that recommendation may have influenced the drafting of the WTO 
Agreement over the next several years.68 
 
Agreement, Annex 1A, art. 7 (1994), http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/15-
sps.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2004) [hereinafter SPS Agreement]. 
 60. General Agreement on Trade in Services, WTO Agreement, Annex 1B, art. III 
(1994), http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2004) 
[hereinafter GATS]. 
 61. Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, art. 12, 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/20-val_01_e.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004) 
(known as the “Customs Valuation Agreement”). 
 62. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO 
Agreement, Annex 1C, art. 63, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2004) 
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
 63. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, art. 13 (1994), 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2004) 
[hereinafter Antidumping Agreement]. 
 64. GATS, supra note 60, art. VI, para. 2(a). 
 65. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 62, art. 41, para. 4. See Ernst-Ulrich 
Petersmann, International Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement 
System 1948–1996: An Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND THE 
GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 3, 72-74 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 
1997), for a discussion on judicial review in WTO law. The issue of judicial review at 
the national level is separable from transparency and participation, and is too large 
an issue to be covered here. 
 66. See WTO Agreement, supra note 58. 
 67. Robert Wolfe, Regulatory Transparency, Developing Countries and the WTO, 
2 WORLD TRADE REV. 157, 161 (2003). 
 68. See GATT, TRADE POLICIES FOR A BETTER FUTURE: PROPOSALS FOR ACTION 36 
(1985) (suggesting that all countries develop organizations in which interested 
parties and consumers can express their views on trade policy actions before 
decisions are made). This report was written by a seven-man eminent persons group 
chaired by Fritz Leutwiler, a noted Swiss and international banker. 
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Provisions to provide private participatory rights and 
opportunities at the national level are present in many of WTO sub-
agreements.69 For example, the Agreement on Safeguards states that 
a government’s investigation shall provide for public hearings (or 
other appropriate means) in which importers, exporters, and other 
interested parties can present evidence and their views.70 The GATS 
states that where appropriate, WTO Members “shall work in 
cooperation with relevant intergovernmental and nongovernmental 
organisations towards the establishment and adoption of common 
international standards and criteria for recognition” for the practice 
of relevant services trades and professions.71 The Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) provides that before adopting a 
standard, a national standardizing body is to allow a period of at 
least 60 days for interested parties to submit comments on the draft 
standard (unless urgent problems arise).72 Furthermore, the 
standardizing body is required to “take into account” such 
comments.73 The Antidumping Agreement has an Article on “Public 
Notice and Explanation of Determinations” and also requires that 
the antidumping adjudication provide opportunities for interested 
parties to provide evidence and for consumer organizations to provide 
information.74 WTO member governments have gone even further in 
providing for private participatory rights in the context of accession 
agreements whereby governments join the WTO.75 The most 
 
 69. None of these WTO provisions provide for participation in the national 
legislative process. 
 70. Agreement on Safeguards, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, art. 3.1 (1994), 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/25-safeg.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2004). 
 71. GATS, supra note 60, art. VII, para. 5. 
 72. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade [hereinafter TBT Agreement], WTO 
Agreement, Annex 1A, Annex 3, Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption, 
and Application of Standards, para. L (1994), 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2004) 
(requiring interested parties to be within the territory of a WTO member country) 
[hereinafter Code of Good Practice]. The WTO has published a booklet on the TBT’s 
transparency requirements. See WTO Secretariat, Transparency Provisions of the 
TBT Agreement, April 2002, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/booklet_transparency_e.doc (last visited 
Nov. 3, 2004). 
 73. Code of Good Practice, supra note 72, para. N. These obligations inure to 
bodies that have accepted the Code and WTO member governments are responsible for 
assuring that central government standardizing bodies accept the Code. TBT 
Agreement, supra note 72, art. 4. 
 74. Antidumping Agreement, supra note 63, arts. 6.1.2, 6.12, 12. 
 75. See, e.g., Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Cambodia, 
WT/ACC/KHM/21, para. 216 (Aug. 15, 2003), 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/completeacc_e.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 
2004). 
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expansive demands came in the negotiations with China.76 As Julia 
Ya Qin has pointed out, China agreed to provide an opportunity for 
public comment on all new draft laws and regulations affecting 
trade.77 Qin notes that this “mandatory public comment period 
clearly exceeds the requirements of existing WTO rules.”78 
In summary, with regard to its oversight of national trade and 
trade-related regulation, WTO law requires governments to 
maintain a large degree of transparency and some degree of 
participation for the benefit of traders and other interested persons.79 
This law demonstrates an acknowledgement by governments that 
transparency and participation are important ingredients in good 
governance at the national level. 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSPARENCY NORMS WITHIN THE WTO 
Unfortunately, WTO member governments have adopted a 
different and inconsistent position with regard to norms for WTO 
transparency and to the participation of nonstate actors in the policy 
and rulemaking activities of the WTO.80 Although the text of the 
WTO Agreement does not require that WTO negotiations be kept 
confidential and does not forbid participatory opportunities for the 
public, the WTO has often insisted on secrecy and resisted 
participation by social and economic actors.81 That said, it needs to 
be noted that the zone of secrecy and insularity has continued to 
narrow since the WTO was born in 1995.82 Still, a great deal of room 
for improvement exists. 
Let me briefly summarize the current practices of the WTO 
regarding transparency and participation. The WTO website has 
many download options and features a huge collection of documents 
 
 76. See Julia Ya Qin, “WTO-Plus” Obligations and Their Implications for the 
World Trade Organization Legal System, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 483, 491-93 (2003) 
(noting the WTO negotiations with China). 
 77. Id. at 493. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Cf. Peter M. Gerhart, The Two Constitutional Visions of the World Trade 
Organization, 24 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1, 61 (2003) (“It is no exaggeration to say that 
the WTO treaties form a kind of Administrative Procedure Act for foreigners who 
might be adversely affected by government action.”) (footnote omitted). 
 80. See Frank Loy, Public Participation in the World Trade Organization, in THE 
ROLE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 113, 119-21 (Gary 
P. Sampson ed., 2001). 
 81. See Julio A. Lacarte, Transparency, Public Debate and Participation by NGOs 
in the WTO: A WTO Perspective, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 683, 683-84 (2004). 
 82. See, e.g., Procedures for the Circulation and Derestriction of WTO Documents, 
WT/L/452 (May 14, 2002), 
http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/bernie_derestrictiontext_e.htm (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2004). 
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available without charge.83 For WTO legislative activities, the main 
exclusions are draft negotiating texts and some analyses prepared 
by the Secretariat.84 For WTO judicial activities, the main exclusions 
are the government briefs to the panels and Appellate Body, 
interlocutory procedural rulings, and the panel’s interim report.85 
Most documents are posted in a timely manner except for minutes of 
various WTO meetings which tend to lag a few months. Other than 
plenary sessions of WTO Ministerial Conferences, all official WTO 
meetings are closed to the private sector and nongovernmental 
organizations (“NGOs”).86 Over the past decade, however, the WTO 
Secretariat has organized a number of seminars, symposia, and 
workshops in which accredited NGOs and business representatives 
participate.87 
With regard to dispute settlement, all oral hearings of WTO 
panels and the Appellate Body are closed to the public.88 On many 
occasions in recent years, NGOs and private individuals have 
submitted unsolicited amicus curiae briefs to panels and the 
Appellate Body.89 Subsequent to the Appellate Body’s landmark 
decision in 1998 in favor of the admissibility of amicus curiae 
 
 83. See http://www.wto.org. See also HETTY KOVACH ET AL., ONE WORLD TRUST, THE 
GLOBAL ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: POWER WITHOUT ACCOUNTABILITY? 15 (2003), 
available at http://www.oneworldtrust.org/htmlGAP/report/report.htm (last visited 
Nov. 3, 2004), which rated the WTO second among the reviewed international 
organizations for access to online information. 
 84. The “JOBS” document series, covering negotiations, are not released by the 
WTO. See http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=advanced (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2004) (By selecting “Advanced Search” and entering “Jobs” in 
“Collection” field, one will reach an error page that indicates that this document “is 
not yet available to the public.”). 
 85. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, 33 I.L.M. 1226, arts. 4.6, 13.1, 14.1, 17.10, 18.2 
(1994), http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2004) 
[hereinafter DSU]. A panel’s interim report is not made public, but the final report 
discusses any changes made to the interim report following review and comment by 
the parties. In practice, the decision reached in an interim report is often leaked to 
the press. See, e.g., Gambling Ban Struck Down, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2004, at E2 
(reporting on interim ruling in U.S. online gambling case). 
 86. DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 145 (2001) (“The virtual 
entirety of WTO proceedings are closed to public view.”). 
 87. See, e.g., WORLD TRADE ORG., WORKSHOP ON DOMESTIC REGULATION - 
PROGRAMME (Mar. 29-30, 2004), 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/workshop_march04_e/workshop_program
me_march04_e.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004) (detailing an agenda of a workshop held 
by the WTO Secretariat on domestic regulation that included presentation by persons 
from International Bar Associations, the International Union of Architects, the 
International Council of Nurses, and the European Express Association). 
 88. WALLACH & WOODALL, supra note 3, at 245. 
 89. DAVID PALMETER & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 35-36 (2nd ed. 2004). 
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briefs,90 a common practice is that the Appellate Body will consider 
accepting an amicus brief, yet will not take it into account in deciding 
the case.91 The panel practice is more variable. A trend that may be 
developing is that the panel makes a preliminary ruling that it will 
consider arguments in an amicus curiae brief only to the extent that 
the argument is voiced by one of the governmental parties.92 
The WTO Agreement, Article V:2, provides authority to the 
WTO General Council to “make appropriate arrangements for 
consultation and cooperation with non-governmental organizations 
concerned with matters related to those of the WTO.”93 Article V:2 
was based on a similar institutional provision in the ITO Charter,94 
which was modeled on one in the U.N. Charter.95 The WTO General 
Council implemented Article V:2 in 1996 by enacting Guidelines for 
Arrangements with NGOs.96 
These Guidelines delineate a narrow role for NGOs based on the 
following rationale: 
As a result of extensive discussions, there is currently a 
broadly held view that it would not be possible for NGOs to 
be directly involved in the work of the WTO or its meetings. 
 
 90. See U.S. Shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra note 54, paras. 104-10 
(explaining the admissibility of amicus curiae briefs). The trend to accept NGO 
participation in intergovernmental litigation was first reported on by Dinah Shelton. 
See Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in 
International Judicial Proceedings, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 611, 616 (1994) (noting the 
positive development in the acceptance of amicus participation by NGOs in 
international cases). 
 91. See, e.g., United States – Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-
Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United 
Kingdom, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS138/AB/R, para. 42 (adopted May 10, 
2000), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/2340d.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2004) 
(where the Appellate Body found it unnecessary to take the amicus curiae briefs into 
account, but held they had the authority to do so). 
 92. See United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect 
to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, Report of the Panel, WT/DS257/R, para. 7.1 
n. 75 (adopted Feb. 17, 2004), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/257r_a_e.doc 
(last visited Nov. 3, 2004) [hereinafter Softwood Lumber Final Determination]. 
 93. WTO Agreement, supra note 58, art. V, para. 2. 
 94. See Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment: 
Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, Mar. 24, 1948, art. 87, para. 2, 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/havana_e.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2004) 
[hereinafter Havana Charter for an ITO]. 
 95. U.N. CHARTER art. 71. As Susan Aaronson points out, “[a]lthough the 
architects of the ITO provided for a role for civil society, the GATT bureaucracy 
turned insular.” SUSAN ARIEL AARONSON, TAKING TRADE TO THE STREETS: THE LOST 
HISTORY OF PUBLIC EFFORTS TO SHAPE GLOBALIZATION 54 (2001). 
 96. Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with Non-Governmental 
Organizations, WT/L/162 (July 23, 1996), 
http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/guide_e.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004) 
[hereinafter NGO Guidelines]. 
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Closer consultation and cooperation with NGOs can also be 
met constructively through appropriate processes at the 
national level where lies primary responsibility for taking 
into account the different elements of public interest which 
are brought to bear on trade policy-making.97 
The General Council did not seek to explain why governments 
held that view and why they thought that the WTO was different 
from other international organizations where it is possible for NGOs 
to be directly involved in ongoing work and to observe it firsthand. 
Furthermore, the Council did not explain why the national level has 
the primary responsibility to take into account different elements of 
the public interest on trade policymaking, and if so, what remains as 
the raison d’être of the WTO. The narrowness of the assumption 
undergirding the Guidelines shows that a great deal more 
transparency and inclusion could be achieved by the WTO without 
having to renegotiate the treaty. 
What would be the rationale for such a reform? In my view, the 
different positions espoused by the WTO for states and for itself 
cannot be reconciled. Prescribing outwardly to the national level, the 
WTO pushes the boundaries of international law regarding the need 
for transparency and participation. Yet in self-government, the WTO 
resists adopting features of transparency and participation practiced 
in other international organizations. 
That inconsistent stance is troubling. Simply put, the WTO 
should practice what it preaches. The “principle of fundamental 
importance” articulated by the Appellate Body in the Cotton 
Underwear case that WTO members “and other persons affected, or 
likely to be affected, by governmental measures . . . should have a 
reasonable opportunity to acquire authentic information about such 
measures and accordingly to protect and adjust their activities or 
alternatively to seek modification of such measures” applies just as 
much to WTO measures as it does to national measures.98 
The position expressed in the Guidelines that NGOs should 
limit their participation to the national level is based on an orthodox 
view of international relations. The key assumption is that states 
are the only relevant actors in international relations and that 
states should speak with a unitary voice to each other. Within each 
state, it is entirely appropriate for the ruling government to solicit 
the views of domestic (or foreign) actors in the setting of trade 
policy.99 At the WTO, however, it is thought that the flow of ideas 
 
 97. Id. para. VI. 
 98. U.S. Cotton Underwear Appellate Body Report, supra note 48, at 21. 
 99. See Brian Hocking, Changing the Terms of Trade Policy Making: From the 
“Club” to the “Multistakeholder Model,” 3 WORLD TRADE REV. 3 (2004) (discussing 
new developments in modes of participation at the national level). 
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has to be channeled through member governments. 
In my view, this position may be coherent in the abstract, but is 
inappropriate for life on a planet that shares a common environment 
and increasingly, a common economy and social community. By 
denying the opportunity for NGOs to observe and participate more in 
WTO activities, the WTO is undermining its opportunity to promote 
greater transparency, participation, and accountability at the 
national level. Certainly, the WTO sets a bad example. Even worse, 
the WTO’s reputation for secretiveness and single-mindedness may 
make it harder to maintain public support for the world trading 
system. 
For instance, in the United States, the 2002 law providing trade 
promotion authority passed the U.S. House of Representatives by 
three votes.100 That law sets U.S. objectives for WTO negotiations, 
and one objective, on “Transparency,” calls for “public access for 
appropriate meetings, proceedings, and submissions” to and at the 
WTO.101 If this U.S. objective remains unrequited, then future 
Congressional votes regarding the WTO may not go as positively. 
A. Administrative Law at the WTO102 
The politics aside, some conceptual issues call for attention. A 
core question is whether the WTO’s requirements for publication, 
notice and comment, and judicial review at the national level are 
relevant principles to be applied reflexively to the intergovernmental 
WTO. Similar requirements at the national level are generally 
understood as a means to promote the accountability of and 
democratic control over administrative agencies operating with 
delegated authority from lawmakers. But is the WTO an 
international administrative agency to which such principles might 
logically be applied? 
The WTO does not lend itself to easy typologies, but in my view, 
it can be seen as an international administrative agency. The 
member governments that established the WTO endowed it with 
“such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its 
 
 100. Rossella Brevetti et al., Trade Policy: Senate Set to Clear Trade Package After 
House Approves Bill by 3 Votes, INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA), Aug. 1, 2002, at 1334. 
 101. Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, § 2102(b)(5)(B), 116 Stat. 933, 996 (2002). 
 102. In this article, I do not explore the connection between the changing vision of 
the WTO’s responsibilities and the broader issue of the responsibility of 
international organizations for following general international law. For an 
introduction to the issue of the responsibility of international organizations, see JAN 
KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW ch. 14 (2002). In 
addition, I do not discuss the most common concern of international administrative 
law regarding the law governing how an international organization treats its 
employees. See C. WILFRED JENKS, THE PROPER LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANISATIONS 27-33 (1962); C.F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL 
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ch. 11 (1996). 
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functions,” and also provided that WTO officials would have the 
privileges and immunities necessary for the “independent exercise” of 
their functions.103 The main functions of the WTO are to “facilitate 
the implementation, administration and operation, and further the 
objectives” of the WTO Agreement, and to “provide the forum for 
[trade]negotiations.”104 During the course of trade negotiations, the 
WTO Members may agree to make amendments to WTO law and to 
the schedules containing national commitments on trade in goods 
and services.105 
Some might resist the notion of the WTO as an administrative 
agency on the grounds that it is a legislative body, but that claim is 
weak. Because trade negotiations are so central to the WTO’s 
mission, the WTO could be characterized as an international 
legislature. As a legislature, however, the WTO has an unusual 
decision rule. In general, any action by the WTO requires 
consensus.106 Moreover, even after an amendment to the WTO is 
approved, that amendment has to be accepted by a member 
government before becoming binding on that government.107 Thus, 
member governments do not transfer or cede lawmaking power to 
the WTO. 
On the other hand, some might embrace the notion of the WTO 
as an administrative agency on the false grounds that governments 
delegate decisionmaking authority to it, yet such a claim is 
mistaken.108 A state cannot delegate authority that it does not have 
and none of the international functions of the WTO are 
accomplishable by a solitary state. What has happened instead is 
that governments have established and joined the WTO, agreed to 
abstain from practices that violate WTO law, and assigned the WTO 
certain functions for promoting trade cooperation.109 The governments 
have also assigned adjudicatory and compliance functions to the 
 
 103. See WTO Agreement, supra note 58, art. VIII, paras. 1, 3; Michael N. Barnett & 
Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International 
Organizations, 53 INT’L ORG. 699 (1999) (viewing international organizations as 
purposive actors). 
 104. See WTO Agreement, supra note 58, art. III, paras. 1, 2. 
 105. See, e.g., WTO Agreement, supra note 58, art. X; GATT, supra note 34, art. 
XXVIII bis; GATS, supra note 60, art. XIX. 
 106. See WTO Agreement, supra note 58, art. IX, para. 1 (calling for 
decisionmaking by consensus but also providing for majoritarian decisionmaking). 
 107. WTO Agreement, supra note 58, art. X. The only exception is amendments to 
certain provisions in GATS which may become binding on all Members “upon 
acceptance by two-thirds of the Members.” Id. art. X. para. 5. Waivers of WTO law can 
be approved by three-fourths of the Members. Id. art. IX, para. 3. 
 108. For an analysis of international delegations from a U.S. perspective, see 
Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1492 (2004). 
 109. WTO Agreement, supra note 58, arts. I, III, XI, para. 1, XII, para. 1, XVI, para. 4. 
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WTO Dispute Settlement Body and its panels and Appellate Body.110 
Although some might argue that governments have delegated judicial 
(or quasi-judicial) authority to the Appellate Body, that claim is 
faulty because there was no pre-existing national jurisdiction to 
adjudicate a foreign government’s compliance with WTO law.111 
Instead, the governments have created a judicial function at the 
WTO. 
The feature of the WTO that most renders it an administrative 
agency is that the principals—that is, the Members—have given the 
WTO competence as their joint agent to carry out certain discrete 
international functions. Because the Members are incorporeal, they 
must act through various agents including WTO “officials” and “the 
representatives of the Members.”112 Within each government, the 
representative of that Member tends to be an Executive official.113 
Thus, from the perspective of a national legislature, the WTO 
resembles an administrative agency in the sense that it makes 
decisions that affect a domestic polity and yet extend beyond the 
direct legislative control of national elected officials.114 
It is that similarity to the domestic agency that forms the basis 
for the application of administrative law principles to the WTO 
itself. Just as a legislature would impose administrative law on a 
domestic agency to make it more fair, transparent, and accountable, 
that legislature could conceptualize a similar role for the application 
of administrative law principles to the WTO.115 In doing so, the 
legislature (or the electorate) might have two targets in mind: one 
will be the WTO and its decisionmaking. The other will be the 
government’s own representatives to the WTO for which WTO 
secrecy may present a barrier to effective parliamentary (and public) 
 
 110. Id. art. IV, para. 3; DSU, supra note 85. 
 111. With respect to a foreign government, there would be a problem of sovereign 
immunity of governmental acts. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 
451 (1987). I read the WTO DSU as implicitly preserving for Member A the judicial 
power to determine whether A is in compliance with the WTO treaty. See DSU, supra 
note 85, arts. 23.1, 23.2(a). Nevertheless, I am not aware of any WTO Member where a 
national court is routinely reviewing whether that Member government (or a 
subnational government) stands in compliance with WTO law. 
 112. See WTO Agreement, supra note 58, art. VIII, para. 3. 
 113. In some countries, the representative to the WTO Ministerial Council is an 
elected parliamentarian—for example, Mark Vaile, the Australian Trade Minister. 
 114. See OXFAM, RIGGED RULES AND DOUBLE STANDARDS: TRADE, GLOBALIZATION, 
AND THE FIGHT AGAINST POVERTY 255 (2002) (“The problem is that most governments 
can enter into agreements at the WTO without sufficient reference to public opinion 
or parliamentary scrutiny, even though those agreements often involve important 
constraints on national policy.”). 
 115. See Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming 
Challenge for International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 596, 619 (1999) 
(suggesting that administrative procedure requirements at the international level 
“have the potential to serve the same legitimating functions as they do domestically”). 
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oversight.116 
Since each WTO Member’s interaction with the WTO is carried 
out through bureaucrats, diplomats, and occasionally ministers, 
there is a continuing need to achieve accountability for the authority 
that diplomatic and bureaucratic agents exercise at the WTO.117 The 
most obvious context for such accountability is the chain from the 
agent in Geneva to elected officials at home and then outward to the 
national citizenry. Yet in a world economy and in an organization 
like the WTO that operates by consensus, more inclusive and 
complex chains of accountability may be desirable.118 
Legal analysts have not yet developed adequate frameworks for 
understanding the accountability of intergovernmental 
decisionmaking beyond governments to extragovernmental 
stakeholders wherever they are situated.119 Although the norms 
intrinsic to national-level democracy may not be directly applicable to 
 
 116. See Paul B. Stephan, International Governance and American Democracy, 1 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 237, 250 (2000) (stating that the secrecy of international organizations 
makes it hard to monitor government action). This problem would be reduced if 
governments maintained the same transparency with respect to actions abroad as they 
do with respect to actions in the homeland. Allott has suggested that accountability 
expectations accompany a government as it operates internationally. PHILIP ALLOTT, 
THE HEALTH OF NATIONS: SOCIETY AND LAW BEYOND THE STATE 378 (2002) (“When a 
government exercises public-realm power externally, in relation to other 
governments, including in the forming of intergovernmental societies, it carries with 
it the constitutional conditions on the exercise of that power.”). 
 117. Howse points out several ways in which WTO processes tend to loosen the 
accountability of agents in Geneva to the principals back home. For example, the 
bunching of decisions into a large package makes it harder for national legislatures to 
reject what negotiators have achieved. Robert Howse, How To Begin To Think about 
the ‘Democratic Deficit’ at the WTO, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND 
NON-ECONOMIC CONCERNS, supra note 54, at 79, 86-87. 
 118. See ANN FLORINI, THE COMING DEMOCRACY 87-88 (2003) (stating that the direct 
participation of interested people in intergovernmental organizations is a means of 
overcoming the principal-agent problem); Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye Jr., The 
Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and the Problems of Democratic Legitimacy, 
in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND LEGITIMACY. THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE 
MILLENNIUM 264, 291 (Roger B. Porter et al. eds., 2001) (contending that the 
involvement of NGOs in international regimes may enhance accountability); Robert 
Post, Constitutional Law: The Challenge of Globalization to American Public Law 
Scholarship, 2 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 323, 327 (2001) (suggesting that the national frame 
for constitutional and administrative law may be inadequate for international 
organizations such as the WTO); Americo Beviglia Zampetti, Democratic Legitimacy 
in the World Trade Organization: The Justice Dimension, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 105, 110 
(2003) (explaining that democratic legitimacy in international institutions “cannot be 
guaranteed only through legitimate and democratic decision-making within each 
participating state”). 
 119. For recent work seeking to develop administrative law principles for the 
international level, see Giacinto della Cananea, Beyond the State: The 
Europeanization and Globalization of Procedural Administrative Law, 9 EUROP. 
PUB. L. 563 (2003); Sabino Cassese, Shrimp, Turtles and Procedure: Global Standards 
for National Administration (2004) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). 
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the international level,120 they may nevertheless help in thinking 
through an appropriate and effective process for international 
governance.121 Indeed, two different ideas—the pluralist and the civic 
republican—may be relevant. The pluralist will seek to open up 
governance and to provide opportunities for the participation of 
dueling interest groups in the decisionmaking process; the civic 
republican will seek governance decisions that relate to a public 
value discovered through deliberation.122 Both concepts infuse the 
ongoing debate about WTO transparency and participation of NGOs 
in the trading system.123 
 
 120. See John O. McGinnis, The Appropriate Hierarchy of Global Multilateralism 
and Customary International Law: The Example of the WTO, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 229, 
245-46 (2003) (stating that “[b]ecause democratic states can pit the views of one faction 
against another[,] . . . they continue to provide the best mechanisms for distilling the 
will of peoples around the world and converting it into a world legal order”); Joseph 
H.H. Weiler & Iulia Motoc, Taking Democracy Seriously; The Normative Challenge 
to the International Legal System, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND 
NON-ECONOMIC CONCERNS, supra note 54, at 47, 70 (suggesting that “there is no 
demos underlying international governance”); MARTIN WOLF, WHY GLOBALIZATION 
WORKS 209 (2004) (stating that “the place for democratic accountability is [in] the 
legislatures” of WTO member governments). 
 121. See Jost Delbrück, Transnational Federalism: Problems and Prospects of 
Allocating Public Authority Beyond the State, 11 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 31, 54 
(2004) (stating that NGOs “can play an important role as entities that promote 
transparency of transnational decisionmaking processes and thereby strengthen the 
accountability of the different public authorities”). 
 122. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R. VERKUIL, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PROCESS 26-29 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing democratic theory at 
the national level). 
 123. See, e.g., Wolfgang Benedek, Relations of the WTO with Other International 
Organizations and NGOs, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW WITH A HUMAN FACE 479, 
493 (Friedl Weiss et al. eds., 1998) (positing a representation function for NGOs); 
JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION 224 (2004) (stating that NGOs will 
often act to empower less powerful constituencies and to bring their voices into play 
when their votes do not accomplish this); ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY 117 (1998) 
(doubting the possibility of a democratization of international organizations and 
suggesting that international decisions will be made by bargaining among elites, 
including nongovernmental bureaucracies); Robert Howse, The Legitimacy of the 
World Trade Organization, in THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
355, 362 (Jean-Marc Coicaud et al. eds., 2001) (stating that “international civil society 
may underpin deliberative democracy at the [international] level”); GREGORY C. 
SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS (2003) (discussing transnational private sector 
coalitions seeking to influence national trade policy and the WTO); Daniel C. Esty, 
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Governance: NGOs at the World Trade Organization, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 709, 
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1 WORLD TRADE REV. 277, 285-86 (2002) (arguing that the WTO should exclude 
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The traditional administrative law model fits the WTO in some 
respects, yet fails to fit when it comes to judicial review of WTO 
actions. What fits is that principals at the national level can 
demand that WTO-level rulemaking and adjudications be 
appropriately transparent and adhere to accepted norms of due 
process. Where a gap exists is that there is no international judicial 
control on the WTO as an administrative agency, and so that central 
dimension of administrative law is absent. This issue is not as new 
as it may seem.124 The idea of judicial review of the multilateral 
trading system was discussed in the United Nations economic 
negotiations of 1946-48, and a provision was included in the ITO to 
permit Members to ask the International Court of Justice for an 
advisory opinion regarding a decision by the ITO Conference of all 
Members.125 Because the ITO did not go into force, this provision was 
never used. Nevertheless, one of the U.S. negotiators, Seymour 
Rubin—later a highly-respected figure in the community of U.S. 
international lawyers126—anticipated that the “growth of 
international administrative agencies” would eventually draw upon 
legal developments at the domestic level in administrative law and 
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to permit trade and democracy to flourish”); Philip M. Nichols, Realism, Liberalism, 
Values, and the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. LAW. 851, 854-55 
(1996) (criticizing study by Steve Charnovitz for not explaining why international 
interest groups are not already represented at the WTO through national 
governments); Kal Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 401, 
416 (2000) (suggesting that interest groups be allowed to follow suit as the “locus of 
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 124. Seymour J. Rubin, The Judicial Review Problem in the International Trade 
Organization, 63 HARV. L. REV. 78, 79 (1949). 
 125. Id.; Havana Charter for an ITO, supra note 94, art. 96, para. 2. The ITO was to be 
bound by the Advisory Opinion. Havana Charter for an ITO, supra note 94, art. 96, 
para. 5. 
 126. Stephen M. Schwebel, Seymour J. Rubin (1914–2003), 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 310 
(2003). 
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judicial review.127 
B. Improving WTO Transparency and Participation 
The question of whether individuals and NGOs should be able 
to observe and participate in the WTO is highly contested.128 In my 
view, the position espoused in the WTO Guidelines—namely, that 
the participation of individuals and NGOs in trade policymaking 
should occur only at the national level—is undesirable on ethical as 
well as pragmatic grounds. Let me briefly note six reasons 
underlying my conclusion. 
First, the notion that citizen views should be channeled only 
through WTO member governments disadvantages individuals who 
live in countries that are not democratic.129 The General Council’s 
Guidelines suggest that the national level has the primary 
responsibility for taking into account the different elements of public 
interest which are brought to bear on trade policy-making, and yet 
the WTO treaty does not convey a responsibility for member 
governments to be democratic.130 The Guidelines might make more 
sense if all WTO member governments had robust democratic 
accountability. Unfortunately, however, many do not. For example, 
Angola, Bahrain, China, Congo, Cuba, The Gambia, Haiti, 
Myanmar, Oman, Qatar, Rwanda, and Uganda are among WTO 
member countries that do not appear on Freedom House’s 2003 list 
of electoral democracies.131 In response to this point about non-
 
 127. Rubin, supra note 124, at 79, 97-98. 
 128. See, e.g., CLAUDE E. BARFIELD, FREE TRADE, SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY. THE 
FUTURE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 135–42 (2001); KENT JONES, WHO’S 
AFRAID OF THE WTO? ch. 9 (2004); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The WTO in Transition: Of 
Constituents, Competence and Coherence, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 979, 984-87 
(2001); KENT JONES, WHO’S AFRAID OF THE WTO? ch. 9 (2004). 
 129. See Jeffrey Atik, Democratizing the WTO, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 451, 
460–61, 465, 472 (2001). 
 130. See WTO Agreement, supra note 58, arts. XI, para. 1, XII, para. 2; Ernst-Ulrich 
Petersmann, Constitutionalism and WTO Law: From a State-Centered Approach 
Towards a Human Rights Approach in International Economic Law, in THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROBERT E. 
HUDEC 32, 62 (Daniel L.M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds., 2002) (noting that the 
GATT and WTO have never scrutinized the agency relationship between governments 
and citizens); Bruce Stokes & Pat Choate, Democratizing U.S. Trade Policy, COUNCIL 
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 2001, at 67 (noting that most WTO Members do not have full 
transparency, open meetings, and conflict of interest provisions back home), 
available at 
http://www.cfr.org/pub4150/bruce_stokes_pat_choate/democratizing_us_trade_policy.p
hp (last visited Nov. 3, 2004). 
 131. FREEDOM HOUSE, ELECTORAL DEMOCRACIES, available at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/democracies.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 3, 2004). See WTO, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: THE ORGANIZATION - GEMBERS AND 
OBSERVERS, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2004), for a list of the current WTO membership. 
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democratic states at the WTO, Philip Nichols has retorted that the 
factors that preclude constituent “participation at the national level 
will also preclude participation at the international level.”132 In my 
view, Nichols is too pessimistic on that point. 
Second, the lack of openness toward NGOs disenfranchises 
individuals who live in countries that have not yet been allowed to 
join the WTO.133 For example, many people live in WTO-applicant 
countries such as Belarus, Ethiopia, the Russian Federation, Saudi 
Arabia, Sudan, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Yemen.134 None of that 
population has any direct representation in WTO policymaking.135 
This is also true for WTO accession negotiations in which the WTO 
negotiates the terms for a country to join the WTO,136 without 
making any effort to seek the views of interested parties in that 
country. One wonders how the denizens of non-democratic countries 
feel about the WTO’s disinterest in consulting them. 
Third, the WTO’s weaknesses in external transparency and 
participation are especially disabling for individuals from non-
powerful countries. Even when those countries—which tend to be in 
the South rather than the North—have perfect democracies, the 
views of citizens and constituents have to be routed to the WTO 
through a government which may be too weak to have its voice heard 
or heeded.137 In contemporary WTO practice, weak governments are 
often marginalized in WTO decisionmaking.138 Thus, the current 
WTO system of listening to the views of NGOs only through their 
governments privileges citizens of rich, powerful countries. In my 
view, the WTO should seek to counterbalance (or at least be neutral 
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to) the current assymmetries of national power, rather than reinforce 
those imbalances.139 
Fourth, although it is sometimes suggested that the WTO’s 
practice of consensus decision-making140 means that individuals who 
can convince their own government to take a particular stance in the 
WTO can prevent the WTO from taking action in conflict with that 
stance,141 this view leaves out the fact that an individual will not 
only want to prevent the WTO from doing what she perceives to be 
bad, but will also want to get the WTO to achieve good ends. 
Persuading one’s own (WTO member) government is a good start to 
the task of convincing all 147 WTO member governments.142 The 
most efficient place to conduct such discourse will sometimes be at 
the central marketplace for trade policy, that is, at the WTO. Yet 
perversely, the WTO General Council continues to insist on a 
localization of advocacy activities despite the higher transactions 
costs that accrue to individuals and NGOs.143 The WTO will also be 
an advantageous spot for observation of the trade negotiation 
process. If an individual wants to monitor how well her own 
government is negotiating at the WTO, the best place to do that may 
be in Geneva, not in the national capital.144 
 
 139. See Maura Blue Jeffords, Turning the Protester into a Partner for 
Development: The Need for Effective Consultation Between the WTO & NGOs, 28 
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 140. WTO Agreement, supra note 58, art. IX, para. 1. 
 141. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 HARV. INT’L 
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 142. See PETER SINGER, ONE WORLD 75 (2nd ed. 2002) (criticizing the WTO website 
for saying that consensus decision-making is more democratic than majority rule and 
explaining that consensus decision-making favors the status quo). 
 143. See NGO Guidelines, supra note 96. Higher transaction costs are likely to 
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 144. See Howse, supra note 117, at 89 (stating that the presence of NGO monitoring 
at the level of negotiations can help to reduce agency costs). 
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Fifth, by conceptualizing the trade debate as being decentered 
within national units, the WTO reinforces the tendencies of economic 
nationalism to dominate trade policy.145 The “different elements of 
public interest which are brought to bear on trade policy-making” at 
the national level tend to be dominated by the financial interests of 
import-competing industries.146 Other elements of the public 
interest—including volitions for free trade, environmental protection 
or the alleviation of world poverty—may be disadvantaged in a 
debate that is purposefully segmented by homeland. 
Furthermore, the attitude reflected in the WTO’s NGO 
Guidelines seems to assume that the trade debate at the national 
level should funnel in only internal views, and that WTO itself 
should refuse to hear views not pronounced by a government.147 Yet 
that attitude takes away the voice of transnational associations.148 
Such a parochial stance is ironic. Back in 1923, participation by the 
International Chamber of Commerce was appropriate to help 
governments draft the transparency principles in the Customs 
Convention, and now eight decades later, in a far more globalized 
world, the WTO will not allow NGOs like the International Chamber 
of Commerce, Transparency International, or Oxfam to be directly 
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role of international trade institutions in moderating domestic trade policy). 
 146. See NGO Guidelines, supra note 96; JAGDISH BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM 71–73 
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involved in the work of the WTO or its meetings.149 
Sixth, the resistance of the WTO to providing opportunities for a 
dialogue with nongovernmental actors reduces the competition of 
ideas and reinforces status quo thinking.150 The insulated status quo 
may be trade-centric and market-based, or it may be mercantilist 
and pro-producer. Regardless of what values dominate on a 
particular issue, the debate within the WTO can be truncated 
because of limited voices and the lack of an interplay of ideas. To be 
sure, there is a robust debate about trade and its implications in 
Geneva and throughout the world. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely 
that all of the best ideas for trade policymaking get communicated 
and vetted in the rarified atmosphere at the WTO.151 From a civic 
republican perspective, enhancing nongovernmental participation 
may engender more deliberative decisionmaking at the WTO.152 
In summary, the WTO continues to make progress toward full 
transparency, but has stalled in effecting opportunities for 
constructive participation by NGOs and the private sector. Although 
this situation is often criticized, few analysts have made the further 
point that the WTO’s insularity contradicts its promotion of 
participation in the trade law administration of WTO member 
governments. Sooner or later, the normative dissonance involved in 
going in two directions at once will force a reassessment at the WTO. 
My hope and expectation is that the WTO will revise its internal 
rules to provide meaningful opportunities for public participation and 
to promote procedural fairness and regularity as a means of 
enhancing accountability and legitimacy. In doing so, the WTO can 
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be aided by insights drawn from the field of administrative law.153 
The coming challenge will be to fruitfully transplant principles 
developed for a national context to the WTO.154 
III. FUTURE STEPS FOR THE WTO 
Part III presents several proposals for how the WTO can do 
more to enhance transparency and participation both at the national 
level and at the WTO. Section A addresses the national level and 
Section B addresses improvements needed inside the WTO. 
A. National Level 
The most obvious future direction for WTO negotiations is to 
strengthen the obligations in WTO agreements for domestic 
transparency and participation at the national level. Unfortunately, 
very little of this will be accomplished in the current WTO 
negotiating round. The major issue that had been on the table was 
transparency in government procurement, but in August 2004, the 
WTO General Council decided to drop that issue from the 
negotiations.155 
Besides the procedural dimension of national transparency, 
there is also a substantive dimension, and it would still be possible 
for WTO negotiations to make progress in that area. By a 
substantive dimension, I mean attention to government restrictions 
on the inward flow of information. One serious problem today is that 
some governments, such as China, restrict transborder trade in 
informational services provided through the internet.156 Such 
restrictions should be attacked in ongoing GATS negotiations. 
B. Improvements Inside the WTO 
Section B offers proposals in four areas: (1) negotiations, (2) 
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rulemaking, (3) dispute settlement, and (4) parliamentary input. 
1. Negotiations 
The transparency of WTO negotiations continues to improve. 
Before and during the 2001 Ministerial Conference in Doha and the 
2003 Ministerial Conference in Cancún, the WTO did not release any 
of the draft negotiating texts to the public. This gap in information 
made it difficult for the interested public to follow what was 
happening in the negotiations and to influence them. WTO 
opaqueness also occurred with respect to the draft negotiating text 
on the issue of the compulsory licensing of drugs. The so-called 
“Motta Text” of December 16, 2002 was never posted on the WTO 
website.157 Yet in the most recent trade negotiations, the WTO has 
moved away from these restrictive practices. In the days leading up 
to the August 2004 decision,158 the WTO Secretariat posted the draft 
texts.159 
By contrast, the WTO has not made improvements in 
participatory opportunities in the various WTO committees, bodies, 
councils, etc.160 No modalities exist for the public to offer comments to 
negotiators as to how the Doha Round objectives might be 
achieved.161 The WTO’s obstinacy can be contrasted to the openness 
shown in the negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas, 
where the governments have set up a Civil Society Committee, which 
issued an “Open and Ongoing Invitation” for civil society to provide 
written contributions to the governments.162 All (or nearly all) of the 
comments received since 2000 are posted on the FTAA website.163 In 
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my view, the WTO should follow this enlightened practice from the 
Americas. 
2. Rulemaking 
WTO entities have also refused to solicit public comments in 
ongoing rulemaking functions. For example, in April 2004, the WTO 
Appellate Body circulated a set of draft amendments to its Working 
Procedures and invited member governments to submit comments.164 
The Appellate Body, however, did not ask for comments from the 
public or from private attorneys that regularly practice before it in 
representing governments.165 In 2000, the WTO’s TBT Committee 
enacted a decision on “Principles for the Development of 
International Standards.”166 Despite the implications of this decision 
for activities outside the WTO, the TBT Committee did not seek 
public comments. 
The WTO’s hidebound attitude about participation differs from 
that of some other international organizations that have embraced 
new e-government technologies to seek input from the public. For 
example, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change’s Clean Development Mechanism, the Inter-
American Development Bank, and the North American Commission 
on Environmental Cooperation have begun to seek public comments 
on new proposals.167 As more international organizations follow, 
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there will be a greater need for a “Global Register” to announce 
opportunities for public comment.168 There will also need to be 
efficient mechanisms for reading and analyzing public comments to 
international organizations as the number of comments increases. 
3. Dispute Settlement 
The benefits of greater transparency are especially compelling for 
WTO dispute settlement, the one area of WTO law where non-
consensus decisionmaking is imposed. In the eyes of many observers, 
however, the non-transparency required by WTO dispute rules has 
served to undermine the legitimacy of panel and Appellate Body 
decisions.169 Recently, the U.S. government sought to open up panel 
hearings in the Biotech Products case, but the other complaining 
parties refused to go along.170 The U.S. government has been more 
successful in bilateral free trade negotiations, where its prospective 
trading partners have agreed to transparency in dispute panels. For 
example, the U.S.–Morocco Free Trade Agreement states that 
parties have “a right to at least one hearing before the panel and 
that [any] . . . such hearing[s] shall be open to the public.”171 
A body of analysis already exists about the limited progress 
made by WTO panels and the Appellate Body in accepting amicus 
curiae briefs,172 and so that situation will not be reviewed here except 
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to make one point. The Appellate Body ought to be more transparent 
about what it learns from amicus briefs. For example in the 
Softwood Lumber Final Determination decision in 2004, the 
Appellate Body reported that it had received a brief from the 
Indigenous Network on Economies and Trade and a joint brief from 
Defenders of Wildlife, the Natural Resources Defense Council, and 
the Northwest Ecosystem Alliance.173 Without revealing the content 
of the briefs, the Appellate Body then stated that it did not find it 
necessary to take the two amicus curiae briefs into account in 
rendering its decision.174 In a situation like that, the interested 
public understandably has a hard time knowing whether the 
Appellate Body’s reasoning and conclusion would have benefited 
from taking the briefs into account. My recommendation is for the 
Appellate Body to post on its webpage each amicus brief that it 
receives. 
4. A Parliamentary Body 
In recent years, parliamentarians from many countries have 
held occasional interparliamentary conferences to discuss the 
WTO.175 The most recent conference was held in September 2003 
alongside the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún, where 
delegates from seventy national parliaments and five regional 
parliaments participated.176 The declaration adopted by the 
parliamentarians called for a “parliamentary dimension to 
international trade negotiations and arrangements.”177 Although 
about thirty members of the U.S. Congress made the journey to 
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Cancún, none of them participated in the inter-parliamentary 
conference.178 Based on interviews, Gregory Shaffer concluded that 
“[t]he US government and US Congress generally are not supportive 
of global inter-parliamentarian meetings.”179 In my view, this 
attitude by the U.S. Congress is short-sighted and misses an 
opportunity for elected officials to learn from other parliaments. 
Recently, David Skaggs, a former member of the U.S. House of 
Representatives, suggested that “an increased role for national 
parliamentarians and Congresspersons and for national and 
international NGOs should have a direct bearing on the public’s 
sense of the WTO system’s legitimacy and trustworthiness.”180 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The WTO continues to be criticized by friends and foes for its 
penchant for secrecy and its resistance to more open, inclusive 
participatory practices. Moreover, the friends point out how the 
WTO’s closed doors give traction to the foes of world trade order. 
Eventually, WTO member governments will reach a consensus that 
reforms are needed.181 In my view, the sooner the better. 
In this article, I make the case for rewriting the 1996 NGO 
Guidelines182 so as to provide meaningful opportunities for 
nongovernmental participation in WTO operations. The article 
describes the historical roots of the trade transparency norm, 
analyzes the WTO text and related judicial interpretations, and 
then seeks to show that the norms for national trade administration 
should be honored by the WTO. While I do not contend that the 
connection between national trade and international trade law is 
seamless, I do contend that the administrative law principles 
applicable to a national government are relevant to rulemaking and 
adjudication in international organizations.183 As citizens of a nation 
and denizens of the world, our aspirations for good governance 
cannot be cabined within the nation-state. 
 
 178. Gregory Shaffer, Parliamentary Oversight of WTO Rule-Making: The 
Political, Normative, and Practical Contexts, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 629, 641 (2004). 
 179. Id. at 642. 
 180. David E. Skaggs, How Can Parliamentary Participation in WTO Rule-Making 
and Democratic Control Be Made More Effective in the WTO?: A United States 
Congressional Perspective, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 655, 657 (2004). 
 181. Recently, the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
recommended, inter alia, that UNCTAD should make participation of civil society 
and the private sector in its work more systematic in order to enhance the value-
added from that cooperation. São Paulo Consensus, U.N. Conference on Trade and 
Development, 11th Sess., para. 115, U.N. Doc. TD/410 (2004), 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/td410_en.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2004). 
 182. See text accompanying supra note 97. 
 183. See Rubin, supra note 124, at 98 (denoting the field of international 
administrative law). 
 33
 
